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We introduce a new solution concept for games in extensive form with perfect in-
formation, valuation equilibrium, which is based on a partition of each player’s
moves into similarity classes. A valuation of a player is a real-valued function on
the set of her similarity classes. In this equilibrium each player’s strategy is opti-
mal in the sense that at each of her nodes, a player chooses a move that belongs
to a class with maximum valuation. The valuation of each player is consistent
with the strategy proﬁle in the sense that the valuation of a similarity class is the
player’s expected payoff, given that the path (induced by the strategy proﬁle) in-
tersects the similarity class. The solution concept is applied to decision problems
and multi-player extensive form games. It is contrasted with existing solution
concepts. The valuation approach is next applied to stopping games, in which
non-terminal moves form a single similarity class, and we note that the behav-
iors obtained echo some biases observed experimentally. Finally, we tentatively
suggest a way of endogenizing the similarity partitions in which moves are cate-
gorized according to how well they perform relative to the expected equilibrium
value, interpreted as the aspiration level.
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1. INTRODUCTION
“Buy low, sell high” is obviously an oversimpliﬁed rule for investors. It disregards many
aspects of the market that could be taken into account when one makes investment
decisions. Still, this popular wisdom captures an essential aspect of decision making
in complex situations where a decision maker ﬁnds it impossible to evaluate the fu-
ture consequences of her move precisely. This simple rule groups together many such
moves. Indeed, itsuggeststhatoneshoulddisregardallaspectsofthemarketotherthan
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the price. In all states of the market in which the price is high, the investor evaluates all
“buy” moves as superior to “sell” moves, and the opposite is true in all states of the mar-
ket in which the price is low.
More generally, the difﬁculty of evaluating different moves is a feature of most com-
plex games. The strategic form of such games may be so big that it cannot be consid-
ered by real players. In such cases, the task of choosing the right move at each node
is too hard as one has a limited understanding of the future consequences associated
with each possible move. Instead, players can group several moves together, at differ-
ent decision nodes, consider them similar, and evaluate the whole group rather than
each move individually. Where does the similarity of moves come from? It may depend
on some conventional wisdom, either derived from a “narrative” behind the game or
possibly gleaned from the experience of previous players, which contributes to our un-
derstanding of what could possibly be more desirable. Thus, in the investment game we
know enough economic theory (or at least believe that we do) to tell that the price level
should be an important ingredient in making our investment decision. When we think
of a complex game like chess, the similarity of moves can be deduced from the structure
of the game (the board and the rules of the game, which can hardly be seen in the game
tree), which helps us to compare certain moves in different conﬁgurations of the board
(for example, by assessing the strength of a position by the proﬁle of pieces rather than
the board position itself). Having this picture in mind, our premise is that the grouping
of moves into similarity classes is given to players externally, and that it is not a matter
of choice by individual players.
Our analysis is only a ﬁrst step in the study of the grouping of moves. A complete
study should endogenize the formation of this grouping. Here we study mainly the im-
plications of the grouping of moves (assumed to be exogenously given) on the equi-
librium analysis. We illustrate how the solutions obtained differ from other equilib-
rium approaches and explore whether interesting phenomena can be explained by the
approach.
Weconsidergamesinextensiveformwithperfectinformationandassumethateach
player has a partition of her nodes into similarity classes. A valuation of a player assigns
a numerical value to each of her similarity classes.
We introduce two solution concepts for extensive games based on similarity classes
and their valuation: valuation equilibrium and sequential valuation equilibrium.1 A
valuation equilibrium (VE) is a proﬁle of behavioral strategies for which players have
valuations that satisfy two conditions.
• Each player’s strategy is optimal for her valuation. By this we mean that at each
node where she plays she chooses one of the moves that belongs to a class with
maximum valuation.
1Steiner and Stewart (2006) study a learning model applied to coordination games in which the payoffs
obtained with the same strategy are aggregated over nearby states. They show how such a learning process
may select among several equilibria of the underlying coordination games using the techniques of global
games. While such a learning process is related in spirit to our approach (in their model as in ours the no-
tion of similarity is exogenously given), their limiting outcome does not however correspond to a valuation
equilibrium because their model of similarity is not in terms of partition of moves.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Valuation equilibrium 165
• Eachplayer’svaluationisconsistent withthestrategyproﬁle. Thatis,thevaluation
attachedtoaplayer’ssimilarityclassistheexpectedpayoffoftheplayergiventhat
the path (induced by the strategy proﬁle) intersects this class.
We think of the consistency requirement as resulting from a learning process in
which similarity classes are kept ﬁxed (they are externally given) and players keep up-
dating the valuations assigned to similarity classes along the learning process.2 Observe
that the consistency requirement imposes constraints only on the valuations of simi-
larity classes that are reached with positive probability in equilibrium. Our second and
main solution concept, the sequential valuation equilibrium, imposes a stronger no-
tion of consistency that also applies to unreached similarity classes. Very much like se-
quential equilibrium (Kreps and Wilson 1982), sequential consistency requires that the
valuations of unreached similarity classes be consistent with small perturbations of the
strategy proﬁle.
InSection2weformallydeﬁnetheconcepts. InSection3, wediscussthemotivation
for our approach and review some simple ideas in chess (like the values assigned to
pieces) in light of our solution concept.
Sections 4 and 5 make a number of observations regarding valuation equilibrium
and its link to other approaches. We ﬁrst show that in ﬁnite environments a sequen-
tial valuation equilibrium (SVE) always exists, for any given similarity partitions. We
also note that for maximal similarity partitions (i.e., when each move forms a similarity
class), an SVE coincides with a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
In Section 5 valuation equilibria are related to, and contrasted with, other solutions.
The examples in this section are deliberately simple and serve to illustrate a number of
theoretical insights. We ﬁrst consider decision problems. In sharp contrast with stan-
dardnotionsofequilibrium,weprovideaone-agentdecisionprobleminvolvingchance
moves such that in equilibrium the agent makes the worst possible decision at every de-
cision node. In another one-agent setup, the decision maker must make a binary deci-
sion in either problem a or problem b as selected by nature. For a similarity grouping
involving three classes (one class contains one move in each problem a and b, and the
other classes are singletons), we ﬁnd that there are two strict SVEs,3 thus showing that it
is not possible to interpret SVE as a standard solution of a different game possibly with
differentﬁnalpayoffsanddifferentinformationstructuresbutthesamemovestructure.
We next move on to multi-player games. We ﬁrst observe that any sequential equilib-
rium of games with incomplete information and perfect recall can be represented as
an SVE by natural choices of similarity partitions. Thus, the valuation approach covers
the usual information treatment while allowing for more ﬂexibility (as can be inferred
from the one-agent decision problem described above).4 We also contrast the valuation
approach with the imperfect recall approach (Piccione and Rubinstein 1997).
2From the more general perspective in which similarity classes can also be adjusted along the learning
process, our approach implicitly requires that similarity classes are adjusted much more slowly than the
valuations attached to them. The case in which the adjustments of the similarity classes and of their corre-
sponding valuations take place at the same pace may require another solution concept to be considered.
3An SVE is strict if for every player only one strategy is optimal for the valuation.
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In Section 6 we apply the valuation approach to stopping decision problems and
games where we consider the grouping of all non-terminal moves into one similarity
class while terminal moves are singleton similarity classes. We observe that a decision
maker facing several stopping decision problems of length T must either stop imme-
diately in all but one of these problems or go on till the very end, i.e., period T (with
positive probability) in at least one of these problems. This holds irrespective of the
payoffs chosen, which illustrates a systematic timing bias implied by the valuation ap-
proach in such decision problems. Such biases are further explored in more structured
situations in which a positive correlation is assumed between the payoffs obtained with
an immediate stop and the payoffs obtained when the decision maker goes ahead (in
this case we assume that T = 2). In stopping games, we observe that the grouping of
non-terminal moves may allow players to sustain threats that would not otherwise be
credible.
Finally, in Section 7 we brieﬂy suggest a way to endogenize the similarity partitions
based on the idea of an aspiration level. Moves are categorized according to whether
they deliver less, more, or the same level of payoff as a benchmark payoff, referred to
as the aspiration level, which is assumed to be the equilibrium payoff. We refer to such
an equilibrium as an aspiration-based sequential valuation equilibrium (ASVE). After
brieﬂy providing a learning motivation for the aspiration approach, we observe that the
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is always an ASVE, but other strategy proﬁles may
be ASVEs as well. Still, in zero-sum two-player games without chance moves, a player
must get her value in any ASVE. This provides an interesting class of games in which the
aspiration grouping delivers good outcomes.
2. VALUATION EQUILIBRIUM
2.1 Games and strategies
Consider a ﬁnite extensive game with perfect information. It is speciﬁed by (1) a ﬁnite
set of players I, (2) a tree (Z,N,r,A), whereZ and N are the (ﬁnite) sets of terminal and
non-terminal nodes, respectively, r ∈N is the root of the tree, and A the set of arcs, (3) a
non-intersecting collection of subsets (Ni)i∈I of N where Ni is the set of nodes at which
it is i’s turn to play, and (4) a collection (fi)i∈I of functions where fi :Z −→R is i’s payoff
function deﬁned over the set of terminal nodesZ.
Elements of A are ordered pairs (n,m), where m ∈Z ∪N is the immediate successor
of n ∈N. The moves of player i at node n ∈Ni are the nodes in Mi(n)={m |(n,m)∈A}.
The set of moves of player i is denoted Mi =
S
n∈Ni Mi(n).
A (behavioral) strategy for player i is a function σi deﬁned on Ni such that for each
n ∈ Ni, σi(n) is a probability distribution on Mi(n), where σi(n)(m) should be inter-
preted as the probability that move m ∈Mi(n) is selected at n according to σi(n).
The nodes in N \ ∪i∈INi belong to nature, which has a ﬁxed strategy. We assume
withoutlossofgeneralitythatateachofitsnodesn,natureassignsapositiveprobability
to each of the moves at n.
information treatment. Two moves at two different nodes may be members of the same similarity class
even though the number of moves available at the nodes differ.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Valuation equilibrium 167
For a strategy proﬁle σ = (σi)i∈I, we let Pσ be the probability over Z induced by σ
and nature’s strategy. That is, for each z ∈ Z, Pσ(z) is the probability that z is reached
when σ is played.
2.2 Similarity and valuation
Player i has a relation of similarity on Mi, her set of moves. We assume that it is an
equivalence relationship and denote by Λi the partition of Mi into similarity classes.
For m ∈Mi, λ(m) denotes the similarity class in Λi that contains m. For each similarity
class λ ∈ Λi, we let Z(λ) be the set of all terminal nodes that are descendants of some
node in λ.
A valuation for player i is a function vi :Λi −→R.
2.3 Equilibria
We say that the strategy σi is optimal for the valuation vi if for each n ∈ Ni and m ∈
Mi(n), σi(n)(m) = 0 whenever m / ∈ argmaxm0∈Mi(n)vi(λ(m0)). That is, at each of her
nodes, with probability 1 player i chooses only moves that belong to similarity classes
with maximal valuation.
In equilibrium we require the valuations to be consistent with the strategy proﬁle
used by the players. Formally, we say that the valuation vi is consistent with the proﬁle
σ if for each λ∈Λi such that Pσ(Z(λ))>0, we have
vi(λ)= Eσ(fi |Z(λ)), (1)
or equivalently,
vi(λ)=
X
z∈Z(λ)
Pσ(z)fi(z)/Pσ(Z(λ)).
We think of the consistency requirement as resulting from a learning process in
which each player i keeps track only of the average value of picking a move in λ, for
every λ ∈ Λi. More precisely, assume that strategies have settled down at σ, and that at
least one m ∈ λ is played with positive probability according to σ (i.e., Pσ(Z(λ)) > 0).
By keeping track of the average payoff she obtained whenever she played a move in the
various similarity classes in Λi, player i will (eventually) value λ according to (1), as this
valuation corresponds to the expected payoff obtained by player i given that (at least)
one of the moves in λ was played (and that the strategy proﬁle is σ). She will next pick
a strategy that is optimal for her valuation, which gives rise to the following solution
concept.
DEFINITION 1. A strategy proﬁle σ = (σi)i∈I is a valuation equilibrium (VE) if there ex-
ists a valuation proﬁle v =(vi)i∈I such that for each i,
• σi is optimal for vi
• vi is consistent with σ.168 Jehiel and Samet Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
Note that being consistent with σ does not impose any restriction on the valuation
of similarity classes that are not reached under σ. Thus, it is possible that a strategy
proﬁleissupportedbyavaluationeventhoughthevaluationsofunreachedclassesbear
norelationtothetruepayoffsofthegame. Speciﬁcally, aplayermayavoidallmovesina
certainsimilarityclassbecauseithasalowvaluation. Thislowvaluation,inturn,maybe
arbitrarily small, and bear no relation to the payoffs at terminal nodes that are reached
from the class. Still, consistency is maintained because the class is never reached.5
To avoid such equilibria we reﬁne the notion of VE in a way that parallels the notion
of sequential equilibrium. We require that the valuation v reﬂects possible payoffs at
nodes that are not reached, much the same as beliefs in sequential equilibrium reﬂect
possible beliefs at nodes that are not reached.
We say that a strategy σ is positive on similarity classes if Pσ(Z(λ))>0 for each i and
eachλ∈Λi. Wesaythatσ ispositive (orcompletelymixed)ifPσ(z)>0foreachterminal
node z. Clearly, if σ is positive it is positive on similarity classes. The following claim is
obvious.
CLAIM 1. If σ is positive on similarity classes then there exists a unique valuation v that
is consistent with σ.
Wesaythatavaluationvi issequentiallyconsistent withthestrategyproﬁleσ ifthere
exists a sequence of strategy proﬁles (σk)∞
k=1 that are positive on similarity classes and
such that σk converges to σ and vk
i converges to vi, where vk
i is the unique valuation
consistent with σk.
DEFINITION 2. A strategy proﬁle σ is a sequential valuation equilibrium (SVE) if there
exists a valuation proﬁle v =(vi)i∈I such that for each i,
• σi is optimal for vi
• vi is sequentially consistent with σ.
It is easy to see that sequential consistency implies consistency, and thus an SVE is
also a VE.
We could possibly strengthen the notion of sequential consistency by requiring that
the strategies (σk)∞
k=1 are not only positive on similarity classes but also completely
mixed. But as the following claim shows these requirements are equivalent.
CLAIM 2. A valuation vi is sequentially consistent with the strategy proﬁle σ if and only
if there exists a sequence of positive strategy proﬁles (σk)∞
k=1 such that σk converges to σ
and vk
i converges to vi, where vk
i is the unique valuation consistent with σk.
PROOF. Obviously if the condition in the claim is satisﬁed, then in particular the strate-
gies (σk)∞
k=1 are positive on similarity classes, and therefore vi is sequentially consistent
with σ.
5Thisissimilarinspirittothethemedevelopedinthenotionofself-conﬁrmingequilibrium(Fudenberg
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Conversely, suppose that vi is sequentially consistent with σ, and let (σk)∞
k=1 be
a sequence of strategies that are positive on similarity classes such that σk → σ and
vk
i →vi,wherevk
i istheuniquevaluationconsistentwithσk. Letν beapositivestrategy
proﬁle. For each k let γk be the minimum of Pσk(Z(λ)) over all λ (γk > 0 because σk
is positive on similarity classes and there are ﬁnitely many similarity classes). Deﬁne
ˆ σk = (1−γk2−k)σk +γk2−kν. Then ˆ σk → σ and ˆ vk
i → vi, while ˆ σk is positive for each
k. 
3. MOTIVATION AND INTERPRETATION
The valuation approach is closely related to the familiar notion of evaluating board po-
sitions in chess, checkers, and many other games by a few simple criteria such as the
proﬁle of pieces on each side or the position around the center (see Samuel 1959 for an
early investigation of the game of checkers). Adopting the valuation approach, the set of
moves leading to positions with the same features can be viewed as one similarity class.
The optimality condition means that players always choose moves that lead to board
positions with the highest valuations (as determined by the criteria). The consistency
condition endogenizes the valuation assigned to clusters of moves that form a similarity
class. This is in line with the popular view in chess that a queen is worth twice as much
as rook, which we interpret as saying that the chance of winning is roughly the same on
average over all board positions where the queen is replaced by two rooks (whenever
applicable).6
But, the valuation approach is in our view broadly applicable to many interactions
other than chess or checkers. When we are told that it pays to be tough, we attach a
single valuation to a big cluster of moves (as there are many different contexts where
one can be tough). Since being tough may have very different consequences in different
contexts (in bargaining being tough may be good when the other party has no outside
option but not otherwise), attaching a single valuation to being tough introduces a form
of bounded rationality that the valuation approach is designed to capture. Similarly,
when ﬁnancial advisers suggest selling when the market price is high and buying when
it is low they do not make their advice contingent on whether the market is in a bubble
or not, even though this information may obviously affect the true assessment of sell-
ing or buying at the current market price. Again, attaching a single valuation to selling
when the price is high or when it is low induces an oversimpliﬁcation that the valuation
approach is designed to capture.
More generally, the valuation approach is aimed at modeling the interaction of play-
ers in complex environments in which it is too hard to assess the strength of every single
move separately. While most (if not all) of the applications considered below have a
small number of nodes (designed to illustrate theoretical properties), one must bear in
mind that they should be considered as complex situations from the viewpoint of the
players. For example, in the stopping decision problems considered in Section 6, the
6The idea of a criterion obtained by linearly adding the values of pieces introduces an extra element (of
additive separability) that is not present in the valuation approach. Yet, the spirit is clearly related.170 Jehiel and Samet Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
potential duration of the interaction should be thought of as large from the viewpoint of
the players.
4. GENERAL PROPERTIES
4.1 Existence
Since each SVE is also a VE it is enough to prove the existence of an SVE.
PROPOSITION 1. Each game has at least one sequential valuation equilibrium.
PROOF. The strategy of proof is the same as that for the existence of sequential equilib-
ria (Kreps and Wilson 1982). Consider the set Σ" of strategy proﬁles σ" with σ"
i (n)(m)>
" for all n ∈ Ni and m ∈ Mi(n). For any strategy proﬁle σ" ∈ Σ" there exists a unique
valuation v(σ") such that for each i, vi(σ") is consistent with σ". By the equations that
deﬁne valuations, v(σ") depends continuously on σ" in Σ".
We say that player i’s strategy σi is "-optimal for the valuation vi, if for each n ∈ Ni
and m ∈ Mi(n), σi(n)(m) = " whenever m / ∈ argmaxm∈Mi(n)vi(λ(m)). Consider the
correspondence that associates with each σ" ∈ Σ" the set of all strategy proﬁles ˆ σ" ∈
Σ" such that for each i, ˆ σ"
i is "-optimal for the valuation vi(σ"). It is easy to see that
this correspondence is upper hemicontinuous with non-empty closed convex values. It
follows by Kakutani’s ﬁxed-point theorem that there exists σ" such that for each i, σ"
i is
"-optimal for the valuation v"
i , which is the unique valuation of i consistent with σ".
Bycompactness, thereexistσ andv andasubsequenceofσ"k with"k →0suchthat
bothσ"k →σ andv(σ"k)→v. Bycontinuity,σ isoptimalforv andhenceisasequential
valuation equilibrium. 
4.2 The trivial similarity relations
For the two trivial similarity relations, the largest and the smallest, the characterization
of VEs and SVEs is simple enough.
PROPOSITION 2. (a) If for each player i all moves in Mi are similar, then every strategy
proﬁle is an SVE. (b) If for each player i no two different moves in Mi are similar, then a
strategy proﬁle is an SVE if and only if it is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
5. LINK TO OTHER SOLUTION CONCEPTS
In this section we illustrate the working of the SVE concept in a variety of settings. We
ﬁrst consider decision problems that illustrate that the SVE concept is new and cannot
beinterpretedingeneralasastandardequilibriumevenbyvaryingthepayoffandinfor-
mation structures of the players. We next discuss the link of the approach to sequential
equilibrium in games with incomplete information, and to imperfect recall.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Valuation equilibrium 171
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FIGURE 1. A valuation equilibrium in a decision problem
5.1 Decision problems
Obviously, in a decision problem the grouping of moves into similarity classes cannot
beneﬁt the agent. It can only prevent him from making optimal decisions in all circum-
stances. The following example illustrates a more dramatic case in which due to the
similarity grouping, making the worst decision is a valuation equilibrium, while making
the best one is not. This is somewhat surprising in light of the optimality requirement
in valuation equilibrium.
EXAMPLE 1. The decision tree is depicted by the solid lines in Figure 1. At the root r,
nature chooses one of three nodes x, y, and z with equal probability. At each of these
nodes, the decision maker can choose between a good move or a bad one, where the
payoffishigherintheﬁrst. Thepayoffsarewrittennexttothesenodes. Thethreedotted
lines connect similar nodes. Thus, the set M is partitioned into the similarity classes
{gx,gz}, {bx,by}, and {gy,bz}.
The strategy σ that selects the bad move at each of the nodes x, y, and z is a VE. To
see this, consider the valuation v given in the ﬁgure. Obviously, it is consistent with σ,
and σ is optimal for v. Moreover, σ is also an SVE. Indeed, for each k let σk be the strat-
egyforwhichthegoodmoveateachnodehasprobability1/k andthebadoneprobabil-
ity 1−1/k. The unique valuation that is consistent with σk is given by vk({gx,gz}) = 3,
vk({bx,by}) = 5, and vk({gy,bz}) = 4(1 − 1/k) + 12(1/k). Obviously, σk → σ, and for
small enough k, σ is optimal for vk.
Note, however, that the strategy τ that selects the good move at each node is not a
valuation equilibrium. Indeed, for a valuation u to be consistent with τ, it must satisfy
u({gx,gz}) = 3 and u({gy,bz}) = 12. But τ is not optimal for such a valuation u (con-
sider node z). ◊172 Jehiel and Samet Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
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FIGURE 2. Two strict SVEs
COMMENT. In Example 1 the role of nature is crucial. In a decision problem (i.e., a game
with one player) without moves of nature, any strategy σ that guarantees the maximal
payoff is a sequential valuation equilibrium.
The next example illustrates the possibility of multiple equilibria in a one-agent de-
cision problem such that in each equilibrium there is a unique strategy that is optimal
for the valuation (incentives are strict). This simple example thereby illustrates that it is
not possible to interpret the set of SVEs as the set of sequential equilibria of a game with
modiﬁed payoff and information structures, since such modiﬁcations are incapable of
producing two strict Nash equilibria in a one-agent decision problem.7 Thus, SVE is a
new solution concept that cannot be reduced to existing ones.8
EXAMPLE 2. The decision tree is depicted by the solid lines in Figure 2. At the root r,
naturechooseseachofthenodesx andy withequalprobability. Atnodex, thedecision
maker can choose between nodes mx and lx, and at y between my and ry. The dotted
line connects similar nodes. Thus, the nodes are grouped according to their names.
That is, the set of moves is partitioned into three similarity classes, Left={lx}, Middle=
{mx,my}, and Right={ry}.
The strategy that selects the move in Middle at each of the nodes x and y is an SVE.
The corresponding valuation is v(Left) = 1, v(Middle) = 3.5, v(Right) = 3, and the strat-
egy is clearly optimal for this valuation.
The strategy that selects the moves in Middle at x and Right at y is also an SVE. The
corresponding valuation is v(Left) = 1, v(Middle) = 2, v(Right) = 3, and the strategy is
clearly optimal for the valuation.
There is no other pure strategy SVE. ◊
7If the decision maker does not observe whether she is at x or y and faces the choice between m and an
move other than m (in both x and y), then the only equilibrium is that the decision maker chooses m.
8The psychological game approach of Geanakoplos et al. (1989), in which agents directly care about the
belief of others about their strategies, also allows for multiple equilibria in decision problems. Here there is
nodependenceoftheutilityonthebelief,andthemultiplicitycomesfromthedependenceofthevaluation
on the strategy.Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Valuation equilibrium 173
5.2 Games with imperfect information
As noted above, in Example 2, the solution of an SVE cannot be reduced to that of a se-
quential equilibrium in some associated game. We now show how any sequential equi-
librium of a game with imperfect information can be interpreted as an SVE of a game
with perfect information and a similarity relation that is the partition of moves into ac-
tions in the former game.
Formally, consider an imperfect information game deﬁned on the tree (Z,N,r,A)
with payoff function fi. Let Υi be the partition of i’s nodes, Ni, into the information sets
Ii of player i. For each Ii ∈ Υi let L(Ii) be the set of labels of arcs (or actions) that start
at nodes in Ii. The set of successors (i.e., moves) of nodes in Ii can be partitioned by the
labels of the arcs in L(Ii) that lead to them. By partitioning the successors of the nodes
in each information set we obtain a partition Λi of all of i’s moves.
PROPOSITION 3. Consider an extensive game with imperfect information and perfect re-
call deﬁned on (Z,N,r,A) with players I, payoff functions (fi)i∈I, and move partitions
(Λi)i∈I. Let an assessment (σ,µ) of this game (where µ denotes a belief system) be a se-
quential equilibrium. Then σ is a sequential valuation equilibrium of the game deﬁned
over (Z,N,r,A) with payoff functions (fi)i∈I and similarity relations (Λi)i∈I.
PROOF. Let (σk) be the sequence of strategy proﬁles in the deﬁnition of the sequen-
tial equilibrium (σ,µ), such that σk > 0 for each k and σk → σ. For each σk, deﬁne
the valuation vk by (1). Because of the positivity of σk, vk is deﬁned for each λ and is
consistent with σk.
Let v be the limit of (vk). Since µ is the limit of the conditional probabilities of σk
on the information sets, it follows that for each player i and each similarity class λ∈Λi,
vi(λ) is i’s expected payoff conditional on being at one of the nodes in λ. This expected
payoffiscomputedusingtheprobability(givenbyµ)ofthenodesintheinformationset
that lead to λ, and the probability of reaching each of the terminal nodes (given by σ).
By the very deﬁnition of sequential rationality, σi is optimal for vi. 
The converse of this proposition does not hold. That is, an SVE σ of the game with
the similarity classes (Λi)i∈I need not be the strategy proﬁle σ of a sequential equilib-
rium (σ,µ) of the original game with incomplete information. This is so because σ may
not even be a strategy in the original game. Indeed, suppose that in a given information
set{n1,...,nk}∈Υi,therearetwomovesthatmaximizei’sexpectedpayoff. Inthatcase,
the strategy σ may assign one move at some nodes and the other move at other nodes.
5.3 Imperfect recall
The bundling of a player’s moves into similarity classes resembles the bundling of a
player’s decision nodes into information sets in games with imperfect memory. How-
ever, the two bundlings are very different. Information sets reﬂect the inability of a
player to distinguish between different pasts, while similarity classes reﬂect her inability
to distinguish between different futures, and in particular the payoffs that result from174 Jehiel and Samet Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
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FIGURE 3. The absent-minded driver game
these futures. Thus valuation equilibrium can differ very much from imperfect recall in
its modeling and predictions. To illustrate this, we consider the absent-minded driver
game analyzed by Piccione and Rubinstein (1997).
At the intersection r, the driver may either exit to e1 (turn left) and get a payoff of a
or go straight ahead to the next intersection s1. At s1 he may either exit to e2 (turn right)
andgetapayoffofb orgostraightaheadtos2 andgetapayoffofc. Itisassumedthatb is
greater than a and c so that ideally the driver wants to continue to the next intersection
and exit there.
The imperfect recall approach assumes that, being unable to distinguish between
the two decision nodes, the driver mixes the decision of exiting at both of them and the
decision of going straight at each of them.
There is no imposition in the valuation approach that if the moves of going straight
are bundled into a single similarity class the moves of exiting must be bundled too.
For example, suppose the driver distinguishes between the turn left and the turn right
moves but bundles together the go straight moves. His similarity partition is thus
straight ={s1,s2},left={e1}andright={e2}. TheonlySVEisthatthedrivergoesstraight
ﬁrstandexitsatthesecondintersectionnode,resultinginthemaximalpayoffofb. (This
is, of course, very different from the outcome of the imperfect recall approach, in which
the probability of exit should be the same at the two decision nodes.)
To see this we ﬁrst check that exiting at the second intersection is an SVE. The cor-
responding valuations are v(straight) = b, v(left) = a, v(right) = b and the assumed
strategy is optimal given the valuation. No other equilibrium can arise, as sequential
consistency implies that v(left) = a, v(right) = b and it is readily veriﬁed that one can-
not sustain an equilibrium with v(straight)<b (since optimality requires that the driver
turns right at the second decision node and sequential consistency in turn requires that
v(straight) = b, leading to a contradiction). Thus, one should have v(straight) = b, im-
plying that the driver goes straight ﬁrst and turns right at the second intersection (if he
were to mix at the second intersection this would induce a valuation for straight strictly
less than b).
Our setup permits a bundling similar to that of imperfect recall. But, as we now
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either of the solutions proposed in Piccione and Rubinstein (1997). To see this, assume
now that the driver bundles the exit moves on the one hand (exit = {e1,e2}) and the
straight moves on the other (straight ={s1,s2}).
A ﬁrst observation is that our solution concept does not force the driver to exit with
the same probability at nodes r and s1. (This is similar to the observation made above
for games with incomplete information.) However, in order to highlight another (more
interesting) difference from the imperfect recall approach, we restrict ourselves to equi-
libria in which the behavioral strategies are the same at r and s1. We assume that c <
(a +b)/2 so that always going straight is not an equilibrium of the imperfect recall kind
(whatever the approach considered in Piccione–Rubinstein).
Let α be the probability that the driver goes straight at his two decision nodes r and
s1. Under the assumed similarity partition, the valuations consistent with such a strat-
egyshouldbev(exit)=(a+αb)/(1+α)andv(straight)=(1−α)b+αc. Forsuchastrategy
to be an equilibrium, we need v(exit)=v(straight) or9
αVE =
−(b −c)+
p
(b −c)2 +4(b −a)(b −c)
2(b −c)
.
This probability of going straight does not correspond to that arising from either the
modiﬁed multi-self approach10 (or the ex ante optimal approach), which yields α∗ =
(b −a)/(2(b −c)), or the multi-self approach11 proposed by Piccione–Rubinstein, which
yields αPR =(b −a)(3(b −c)).
Note that αVE > α∗ (whereas for some parameter values, say a = 0, b = 4, c = 1,
we have α∗ > αPR). Interestingly, had we considered a notion of consistency so that
vi(λ) =
P
z∈Z(λ)Pσ(z)h(z,λ)fi(z)/
P
z∈Z(λ)Pσ(z)h((z,λ)

where h(z,λ) is the number
of times the path leading to z intersects the similarity class λ, we would have obtained
the probability α∗ of going straight with the valuation approach. We obtain αVE > α∗
because our notion of consistency makes the valuation of straight higher for a given
probability of going straight (our notion of consistency attaches more weight to b than
to c and b >c).
REMARK. Whether our notion of consistency or the one just described is preferable
should be the subject of further investigation. It is immaterial for most of our discus-
sion here. From a psychological viewpoint, our notion corresponds to a situation in
which after each round of the learning stage resulting say in the ﬁnal node z the player
9Observe that α lies in (0,1) whenever c <(a +b)/2.
10This is obtained as a solution to
a +α∗b
1+α∗ =
1
1+α∗ [α
∗c +(1−α
∗)b]+
α∗
1+α∗ c.
11This is obtained as a solution to
α
PR =argmax
α
{λ[(1−α)a +α(1−α)b +α
2c]+(1−λ)[(1−α)b +αc]}
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only remembers that he played a move in λ at least once (as opposed to the number of
times he chose a move in λ) and the payoff attached to it.
6. APPLICATION TO STOPPING GAMES
In this section we study games in which each player in turn can choose either to con-
tinue to play—choose a “go-ahead” move—or stop the game. We are interested in the
effect of bundling all go-ahead moves into one similarity class. The motivation behind
such a grouping is that it may be hard to assess the strength of moves that do not lead
to an immediate end, thus forcing some grouping for such moves. We take the extreme
view that all such moves are bundled into one similarity class. We start with decision
problems and then move on to two-person stopping games.
6.1 Multiple timing decision problems
To start with, nature chooses among ﬁnitely many timing decision problems indexed by
k =1,...,K. Theprobabilitythatnatureselectsproblemk isdenotedpk andisassumed
to be strictly positive.12 Each k-decision problem has the following structure. Non-
terminal nodes are indexed by dates t =1,...,T. We write (k,t) for a non-terminal node
at date t and decision problem k. At each (k,t), t = 1,...,T − 1 the decision maker
may either stop or go ahead. Stopping at (k,t) leads to the terminal node stop(k,t)
with payoff at
k. Go ahead at (k,t) leads to the node (k,t + 1). At (k,T), the decision
maker must choose between lk, yielding payoff bk, and rk, yielding payoff ck. We let
aT
k = max(bk,ck). We assume generic values of at
k such that at
k 6= at 0
k
0 whenever (k,t) 6=
(k0,t 0). AmultipletimingdecisionproblemisdepictedinFigure4forthecase K =2and
T =3.
When the decision maker is fully rational, he should go till date tk = argmaxt at
k in
problem k and stop if tk <T or choose whatever is best among lk or rk if tk =T.
Assume now that the decision maker bundles all non-terminal moves into one sim-
ilarity class called go while all other moves are singleton similarity classes.13 That is,
go = {(k,t +1) | k = 1,...,K and t = 1,...,T −1} and {go,{stop(k,t)}k,t,{lk}k,{rk}k} is
the similarity partition.
Our main observation follows.
PROPOSITION 4. Consider an SVE in the above setting. Either the decision maker stops
immediately with probability 1 (i.e., he chooses stop(k,1) with probability 1) in at least
K −1decisionproblemsorthereisanumber k∗ suchthattheprobabilitythatnode (k∗,T)
is reached is positive.
12In line with our learning narrative (see Section 2.3), one may alternatively view our decision maker
as facing each of the decision problems k in sequence where the frequency of occurrence of problem k
coincides with pk
13This idea of grouping is a bit reminiscent of the model of limited foresight (Jehiel 1995) in that the
decision maker has a coarse forecast about the effect of going on. Yet, the forecast is about one own’s future
play in Jehiel (1995) whereas it is about the average value of going on over several k-problems here. In
Jehiel’s (1995) model, the decision maker never goes till node (k,T) whenever aT
k <a
T−1
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FIGURE 4. A multiple timing decision problem for K =2 and T =3
PROOF. Let K be the set of k ∈ {1,...,K} such that the decision maker goes ahead at
(k,1) with positive probability and assume that K > 1. Since for k / ∈ K the player does
not go ahead, it follows by consistency that v(go) is computed only by the payoffs for
games k ∈ K.
Suppose now by contradiction that there is no k∗ as claimed by the proposition.
Then for each k ∈ K, the decision maker reaches with probability 1 the set of nodes
{stop(t,k)} such that t < T. Reaching such a node, stop(t,k), with positive probability,
rather than going ahead with probability 1 at (t,k), means that ak
t ≥ v(go). Therefore,
v(go) is a weighted average of payoffs at
k ≥ v(go) with k ∈ K and t < T. As |K| > 1, there
are at least two such payoffs, and by the genericity assumption all of them are different.
Thus, this weighted average must be strictly greater than v(go), which is impossible. 
To illustrate Proposition 4 consider the following example. Let k = 1,2 and T = 3
with p1 = p2 = 0.5 and a1
1 = a1
2 = −1, a2
1 = 1, a2
2 = 1.1, b1 =b2 = −2, and c1 = c2 = −3.14
Inthissetting, thereisauniqueSVE. Itissuchthatv(go)=1, thedecisionmakergoeson
tillnode(1,3)withprobability
1
30 inproblem1andgoestostop(2,2)withprobability1in
problem 2. In problem 1, the decision maker goes till the end with positive probability
because otherwise if he were to stop with probability 1 earlier, the high payoff obtained
by going on in problem k = 2 would lead the decision maker not to prefer stopping
before the last node (1,3) in problem 1. Observe that even though the payoffs b1 and c1
are quite low, the expected payoff obtained by the decision maker is 1 under the SVE.
Applied to multiple investment decision problems played in sequence (see foot-
note 12), Proposition 4 means that a decision maker who invests in more than one
14These payoffs are non-generic in the sense deﬁned above. Yet, the same conclusion as in Proposition 4
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enterprise and follows the valuation approach will keep investing till the very end (with
positive probability) in at least one of his enterprises, no matter what payoffs are at-
tached to long-term investments. This obviously implies some suboptimality if keeping
investingtilltheendisabadoptioninallenterprises,butthemagnitudeofthelossneed
not necessarily be large as illustrated in the previous example.
We now consider a modiﬁed version of the above timing decision problem, but in-
stead of a ﬁnite number of problems we consider a density of problems indexed by
a ∈ [0,1] and assume that each problem is drawn according to a uniform distribution
on [0,1]. We also simplify by assuming that T = 2 in each problem and we assume that
a is the payoff obtained by the decision maker in problem a if he stops immediately,
i.e., if he reaches node stop(a,1). We also let h(a) = max(ba,ca) be the payoff obtained
in problem a if the decision maker reaches nodes (a,2). The similarity structure is the
same as before, with go = {(a,2) | a ∈ [0,1]} and all other moves equal to singleton simi-
larity classes.
The structure of the SVE is very simple. Assume v(go) = x ∈ (0,1). The decision
maker will choose stop(a,1) in problem a when a > x and he will choose (a,2) when
x > a (what he does when x = a is irrelevant for the ﬁxed-point calculation). Assuming
that x 6=0,1, consistency then boils down to
v(go)=
R x
0 h(a)da
x
or
x2 =
Z x
0
h(a)da (2)
We wish to compare the resulting decision rule with the efﬁcient decision rule when h
is a smooth increasing function that satisﬁes h0(a) > 1 for all a ∈ [0,1]. This means that
thedifferenceofpayoffsobtainedwhenthedecisionmakergoesaheadintwosituations
a and b is magniﬁed as compared with the difference of payoffs obtained after an im-
mediate stop |h(a)−h(b)| > |a −b|. We assume also that h(0) < 0, and
R 1
0 h(a)da > 1
(which implies h(1)>1 because h0 >0), which ensures the existence ofxV satisfying (2),
and which also guarantees that there is a unique xFB ∈ (0,1) satisfying xFB = h(xFB).
This xFB characterizes the ﬁrst-best decision rule: at the optimum, the decision maker
should go when a > xFB (i.e., when h(a) > a), and he should stop when a < xFB (i.e.,
when a >h(a)).
Since
R x
0 h(a)da/x < h(x) (because h0 > 0), we have xV < h(xV), which implies that
xV > xFB (because h0 > 1). Thus, under the valuation approach, the decision maker
goes ahead when a <xV and stops when a >xV, which leads to an erroneous stopping
decision i) when a < xFB—the decision maker chooses to go when he should stop and
ii) when a >xV—the decision maker stops when he should go. For intermediate values
of a ∈(xFB,xV), the optimal decision is made.
Interpreting our decision problem in terms of investment decisions, the valuation
approach highlights two types of biases: sometimes returns are being taken too quicklyTheoretical Economics 2 (2007) Valuation equilibrium 179
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FIGURE 5. A ﬁnite horizon stopping game
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FIGURE 6. A sequential valuation equilibrium in a two-player game
in favorable markets (where it would pay staying longer) and sometimes positions are
being kept too long in unfavorable markets (where it would pay liquidating earlier).
6.2 Finite horizon stopping games
We now consider two-player stopping games, and comment on some notable differ-
ences between the valuation approach and the analogy-based expectation approach
(Jehiel 2005). Two players A and B move alternately. At all turns pk except the last, a
player decides whether to go ahead (play pk+1) or to stop the game (play tk). The player
at the last turn pn chooses between down (tn) or straight (tn+1). Figure 5 illustrates such
a game.
We are interested in the effect of the grouping of non-terminal nodes. The following
example shows that such a similarity grouping may sometimes allow a player to sustain
threats that would otherwise not be credible, thereby making the player better off.
EXAMPLE 3. Consider the stopping game in Figure 6. In the subgame perfect Nash equi-
librium of this game players A and B go ahead in the ﬁrst two moves, and A stops in the
third with a payoff of 1.
Assume now that player A bundles the non-terminal moves p1 and p3 into a single
similarity class denoted go, while all other similarity classes are singletons.15 Consider
the following strategy proﬁle σ: player A goes ahead at nodes p0 and p2; player B stops
15Observe that the two moves p1 and p3 are such that the average payoff obtained by player A over the
terminal nodes in the corresponding subgames are the same, which may provide another rationale for the
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at node p1 and chooses t4 at node p3. To see that σ is an SVE, consider the valuations
vA and vB that assign to each of the moves ti the payoff of the player at this node, while
vA(go)=2 and vB({p2})=0. It is readily veriﬁed that σi, for i =A,B, is optimal for vi. At
this SVE player A’s payoff is 2, which is more than he gets in the SPNE.
While the grouping of non-terminal moves may explain some non-standard behav-
ior,asillustratedabove,wenotethatinRosenthal’s(1982)centipedegamesuchagroup-
ing gives rise to the same outcome as in the standard case: players stop as soon as they
can.16
To see this, consider the following payoff functions fA and f B in the stopping game
depicted in Figure 5. If player X makes the choice at pk for 0≤k <n, then for all k ≥ j ≥
1, fX(tk−j)< fX(tk)> fX(tk+1). For such payoffs, the backward induction strategies stop
the game at each node. Moreover, in any Nash equilibrium or correlated equilibrium
player A stops at p0.
Consider the grouping of all non-terminal moves while all terminal moves are
treated separately. Thus, player A bundles goA = {p1,p3,...} and player B bundles
goB ={p2,p4,...}, while all other similarity classes are the singletons {ti}.
There is only one SVE: players stop at all the nodes. The proof is by backward in-
duction. Obviously this is true at pn in which the player has no other choice. Suppose
that we have shown this for all the nodes pn,...,pk+1, and consider node pk. Obvi-
ously, vX(tk) = fX(tk). Suppose to the contrary that player X plays pk+1 with some pos-
itive probability. Then, either there is a positive probability that the game reaches node
tk+1, where by the induction hypothesis it ends, or the game never reaches pk. In either
case vX(goA) is a convex combination of the payoffs fX(tk+1), fX(tk),..., fX(t0) where the
weight of fX(tk) is less than 1. Thus, vX(goA)<vX(tk), and player X must choose tk with
probability 1, which is a contradiction. ◊
7. AN ASPIRATION APPROACH TO SIMILARITY CLASSES
It is beyond the scope of this paper to propose a general theory that accounts for the
emergence of similarity partitions, as many factors (outside the interaction itself) may
have an inﬂuence. However, in this section we suggest a narrative that may be of rele-
vance to the endogenizing of the similarity partitions in contexts in which players have
no preconceived view about how to bundle moves.
Speciﬁcally, we look at a situation in which moves are partitioned based on their
performance relative to the equilibrium payoff, thus implying an additional link be-
tween the strategy proﬁle and the similarity partitions. We refer to the idea of aspira-
tion level because the classiﬁcation of a move in these similarity relations depends only
on whether the move performs better than, worse than, or similarly to the benchmark
equilibrium payoff. After formally deﬁning the idea we suggest a learning narrative to
motivate it.
16By contrast, the analogy-based expectation equilibrium approach, which studies an alternative form
of grouping based on the idea that players have a coarse understanding of the reaction function of their
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Formally, for a strategy proﬁle σ and a node n ∈ N ∪Z, we denote by ui(n,σ) the
expected payoff of player i in the subgameGn with root n, with the strategy σn induced
onGn by σ. That is, denoting byZ(n) the terminal nodes ofGn,
ui(n,σ)=
X
z∈Z(n)
Pσn
(z)fi(z).
We denote the expected payoff of player i in the game ui(r,σ) by ui(σ). This expected
payoff is interpreted as the aspiration level of player i induced by σ.
Givenastrategyproﬁleσ, wedeﬁneforeachplayeri theaspiration-basedsimilarity
partition Λi(σ)={λ+
i (σ),λ0
i (σ),λ−
i (σ)} by
λ+
i (σ)={m ∈Mi |ui(m,σ)>ui(σ)}
λ0
i (σ)={m ∈Mi |ui(m,σ)=ui(σ)}
λ−
i (σ)={m ∈Mi |ui(m,σ)<ui(σ)}.
Note that one or two of these three sets may be empty.
DEFINITION 3. A strategy proﬁle σ is an aspiration-based sequential valuation equilib-
rium (ASVE) if σ is a sequential valuation equilibrium with respect to the aspiration-
based similarity partitions Λ(σ)=(Λi(σ))i∈I induced by it.
7.1 Learning to play an ASVE
The concept of an ASVE has a simple interpretation in terms of learning. We sketch here
a learning process the (asymptotic) properties of which should be the subject of future
research. Suppose that players repeatedly play game G. Each player i starts with an
arbitrary grouping of moves into three similarity classes λ+
i , λ0
i , λ−
i some of which may
be empty, and updates them after each history. After history ht the classes are λ+
i (ht),
λ0
i (ht), λ−
i (ht). Given history ht, player i chooses with probability 1−"(ht,i) at node
n ∈ Ni a move m ∈ Mi(n) that belongs to λ+
i if this set is not empty. Otherwise she
selects a move in λ0
i if it is not empty, or else a move in λ−
i . She chooses with probability
"(ht,i) > 0 any move in Mi(n). We assume that "(ht,i) goes to 0 when t tends to ∞.
At each stage, players observe their payoffs and update their aspiration levels by taking
the average payoff obtained over all previous stages. After a given move has been played
a sufﬁcient number of times (the number of times should be increasing with t), the
average payoff resulting from the move is compared with the aspiration level. If it is
sufﬁcientlyabovetheaspirationlevelthemoveisassignedtoλ+;ifitissufﬁcientlybelow
the aspiration level, it is assigned to λ−; otherwise it is assigned to λ0. If the strategies
converge along such a learning process, they must converge to an ASVE.
Compared to our initial learning motivation for the SVE, the above narrative as-
sumes that the similarity partition varies along the learning process (as moves may be
reassigned to different similarity partitions at different rounds of the learning process).
However, the change in the similarity partition is slow compared to the change in the
valuations (this can be seen from our assumption that the valuations of moves are com-
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of times), which ensures that given a similarity relation the game has enough time to
converge to a SVE of the corresponding grouping.
7.2 Analysis
We show that a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is always an ASVE, thereby proving
a constructive argument for why an ASVE always exists. To establish this it is useful to
notethatsequentialconsistencywithσ ofavaluationvi onΛi(σ)impliesthatvi reﬂects
the objective differences of utility in the three elements of the partition.
LEMMA 1. Suppose that a valuation vi on the aspiration-based similarity partition Λi(σ)
is sequentially consistent with σ. Then,
• if λ+
i (σ)6=;, then vi(λ+
i (σ))>ui(σ)
• if λ0
i (σ)6=;, then vi(λ0
i (σ))=ui(σ)
• if λ−
i (σ)6=;, then vi(λ−
i (σ))<ui(σ).
PROOF. To see the ﬁrst inequality, let M = {m1,...,mk} be a maximal set of points in
λ+
i (σ) such that each point in M is not a descendant of any other point in λ+
i (σ), and let
Z(m j) be the set of terminal nodes in the subgame starting at mj. We have Z(λ+
i (σ)) =
∪k
j=1Z(m j), where the latter set is a disjoint union. Choose " > 0 such that ui(m j,σ) >
ui(σ)+" for j =1,...,k. For a strategy proﬁle ν which is close enough to σ, ui(m j,ν)>
ui(ν)+" for j = 1,...,k. Let ν be such a completely mixed strategy proﬁle and let v0
i
be i’s valuation for ν. Note that for a descendant z of m j, Pνmj
(z) = Pν(z)/Pν(Z(m j)).
Thus,
v0
i(λ+
i (σ))=
X
z∈Z(λ+
i (σ))
Pν(z)fi(z)/Pν(Z(λ+
i (σ)))
=
k X
j=1
h X
z∈Z(m j)
Pν(z)fi(z)/Pν(Z(m j))
i
Pν(Z(m j))/Pν(Z(λ+
i (σ)))
=
k X
j=1
ui(m j,ν)Pν(Z(m j))/Pν(Z(λ+
i (σ)))>ui(ν)+".
By the sequential consistency of vi with σ it follows that vi(λ+
i (σ))≥ui(σ)+" >ui(σ).
The last inequality is similarly proved. To show the equality we choose a subset M
of λ0
i (σ) as above. For each m j, ui(m j,σ) = ui(σ). Let " > 0. Then for a strategy proﬁle
ν which is close enough to σ, |ui(m j,ν)−ui(ν)| < ". For a completely mixed ν and its
corresponding valuation v0
i we conclude by the above equations that
|v0
i(λ0
i (σ))−ui(ν)|=



k X
j=1
ui(m j,ν)−ui(ν)Pν(Z(m j))/Pν(Z(λ0
i (σ)))



≤
k X
j=1
|ui(m j,ν)−ui(ν)|Pν(Z(m j))/Pν(Z(λ0
i (σ)))|<".Theoretical Economics 2 (2007) Valuation equilibrium 183
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FIGURE 7. An ASVE that is not an equilibrium
Since this is true for any ν close enough to σ it follows that |vi(λ0
i (σ))−ui(σ)| ≤ ", and
since this is true for any " it follows that vi(λ0
i (σ))=ui(σ). 
We can now show the following result.
PROPOSITION 5. A subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium is an ASVE.
PROOF. Let σ be a subgame perfect equilibrium ofG. Using completely mixed strategy
proﬁles that converge to σ we can deﬁne for each player i a valuation vi on Λi(σ) that is
sequentially consistent with σ. At each node n ∈Ni, σi selects with probability 1 nodes
m ∈ Mi that maximize ui(m,σ). By Lemma 1, σ selects with probability 1 nodes with
the highest valuation at n. Thus, σi is optimal for vi. 
Even though the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is always an ASVE, an ASVE is
not necessarily an equilibrium, as demonstrated by the game in Figure 7. Consider the
strategy proﬁle σ where player A plays t1 and p1 with probability
1
2 each, and player B
plays t2 and p2 with probability
1
2 each. Obviously, σ is not an equilibrium. However,
player B’s expected payoff is
5
4 and therefore λ−
2 (σ)={t2,p2}. Thus, σ2 is optimal for v2.
It is easy to see that the rest of the requirements for an ASVE are satisﬁed for σ.
In zero-sum games without moves of nature, the aspiration grouping results in the
value of the game no matter what ASVE is considered, thus suggesting an interesting
class of games in which the aspiration grouping leads to nice properties.
PROPOSITION 6. Let σ be an ASVE of a two-person zero-sum game without moves of na-
ture. Then the players’ equilibrium payoffs in σ correspond to the value of the game.
We prove this result as a corollary of the next result.
PROPOSITION 7. Suppose that G is a game without moves of nature. Let ρi be the indi-
vidually rational payoff of player i in the game G. If σ is an ASVE, then for each i, its
expected payoff inG under σ, ui(σ), is at least ρi.
PROOF. Assume to the contrary that ui(σ) < ρi. We show that for each n ∈ N ∪Z, if
i’s individually rational payoff in the subgameGn, ρi(Gn), is at least ρi, then ui(n,σ)>184 Jehiel and Samet Theoretical Economics 2 (2007)
ui(σ). The proof is by induction on the depth of the subgame. The claim trivially holds
for n ∈ Z. Suppose now that ρi(Gn) ≥ ρi and the claim holds for all the subgames of
Gn. If n ∈ Nj for j 6= i, then it must be the case that for each m ∈ Mj(n), ρi(Gm) ≥
ρi. Thus by the induction hypothesis, for all m ∈ Mi(n), ui(m,σ) > ui(σ). Therefore
also ui(n,σ) > ui(σ). Suppose now that n ∈ Ni. Then there exists at least one m ∈
Mi(n) such that ρi(Gm) ≥ ρi. By the induction hypothesis, ui(m,σ) > ui(σ). It follows
that m ∈ λ+
i (σ). Since the latter set is not empty, and σi is optimal for vi, it follows by
Lemma1thatσi selectsnodesinλ+
i (σ)atn,withprobability1. Hence,bythedeﬁnition
of this set, ui(n,σ)>ui(σ). In particular, since ρi(Gr)=ρi, we derive the contradiction
ui(r,σ)>ui(σ). 
REMARK. Another corollary of the above proposition is that in a decision problem with-
out moves of nature, an ASVE is an optimal decision.
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have introduced in this paper a new solution concept in which players know/learn
only the average performance of playing over bundles of moves. We have suggested a
learningnarrativetomotivatetheconsistencyrequirementimposedonequilibriumval-
uations. This learning narrative belongs to the family of reinforcement learning models
such as those considered in AI in the tradition of Samuel (1959) (see Sutton and Barto
1998 for a recent textbook on this literature). Note that in contrast to how reinforcement
learning is modeled in game theory (see Fudenberg and Levine 1998 for an exposition)
our underlying reinforcement learning does not consider the reinforcement of strate-
gies (but rather the reinforcement of similarity classes). In Jehiel and Samet (2005) we
consider the case where moves rather than strategies are reinforced and we showed the
convergence to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in extensive form games with
complete information. In this paper, we have gone one step further by assuming that
moves are bundled together into similarity classes and that reinforcement bears on the
similarity classes rather than on the moves separately. The convergence properties of
the corresponding learning models should be studied.17
It should be stressed that our solution concept, valuation equilibrium, assumes that
the similarity classes are exogenously given and do not vary along the learning process
(see however Section 7). In some cases though, it may be argued that as players learn
they also adjust their way of forming similarity classes, thereby leading to potentially
more complex learning dynamics. Clearly, more work is required to analyze such dy-
namics and their corresponding limit points.
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